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The Child's Right to be Heard and
Represented in Judicial Proceedings
Howard A. Davidson*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 1989, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously adopted the "Convention on the Rights of the Child."
The Convention was the result of a decade-long drafting process. It
emerged as a comprehensive compilation of rights-civil-political,
economic-social-cultural, and humanitarian-that all nations of the
world could agree were the minimum rights governments should
guarantee to children.1 The Convention went into force as an inter-
national treaty on September 2, 1990, after ratification by the requi-
site twenty nations. As of February 1, 1991, seventy nations had
ratified the Convention. However, the United States is not yet
among them.2
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child addresses the right of children to have their voices heard, with
the assistance of effective legal counsel, in all judicial or administra-
tive hearings affecting them. The text of the article reads as follows:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting
the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity
to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child,
either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a man-
* B.A., Boston University, 1967; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1970; Director,
ABA Center on Children and the Law. The Center on Children and the Law is a pro-
gram of the ABA Young Lawyers Division that works to improve the rights and well-
being of children in the child welfare, health and educational systems. Opinions stated
herein do not necessarily represent the views of the American Bar Association.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/
736 (1989), reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1456 (1985).
2. Information provided through telephone communication with staff of Defense
for Children International-USA.
ner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.3
This article explores the laws and practices in the United States
that relate to the representation in judicial proceedings aspect of this
important provision of the Convention. The right of all children af-
fected by judicial proceedings to independent representation will be
examined, not merely the rights of those older children considered
capable of forming their own views.4
There are a wide variety of legal matters affecting children that
commonly result in a court taking actions that could have a signifi-
cant impact on them. The most frequent legal proceedings affecting
children will be analyzed herein. These include:
(a) Proceedings brought against a juvenile for the alleged com-
mission of an offense, or because the child is allegedly un-
governable by a parent and thus requires court supervision;
(b) Proceedings affecting a child's custodial or parental visitation
status (including parental divorce or separation, child abuse
and neglect, and termination of parental rights legal actions);
(c) Proceedings to establish a child's paternity or to establish or
modify a parent's support obligation;
(d) Proceedings to have a child adopted;
(e) Proceedings related to the commitment of a minor child to a
psychiatric facility; and
(f) Proceedings related to public school actions affecting a child,
such as expulsion or suspension and the entitlement of a dis-
abled child to certain special education programs and
services.
There are, of course, other types of court cases related to the status
of children. These include, for example, judicial proceedings based
on emancipation petitions5 and immigration/deportation actions af-
fecting unaccompanied minors from another country. In these and
other miscellaneous legal matters, there is much less precedent es-
tablished related to the child's right to counsel than in (a)-(f) above.
The right of a child to be adequately represented in a judicial ac-
tion, brought on his or her behalf for the general enforcement of fed-
eral and state constitutional rights or statutory entitlements, will be
3. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1; 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS at 1461 (emphasis added).
4. There has long been debate among advocates for children as to whether very
young children (i.e., those too young to give direction and control to their attorneys)
should be represented by legal counsel at all. See, e.g., Guggenheim, The Right to be
Represented but Not Heard Reflections on Legal Representation of Children, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984); Note, Lawyering for the Child Principles of Representation
in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126 (1978).
5. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 61-70 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (Emancipation of
Minors Act provides for judicial declaration of a child's emancipation but is silent
about the appointment of counsel for children seeking to be emancipated).
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discussed at the outset of this article. The problems in assuring that
a child has access to competent representation for the judicial en-
forcement of rights are pervasive to all the categories listed above.
II. REPRESENTATION OF THE CHILD IN GENERAL LITIGATION
A. When the Child is a Party
The most significant procedural difference between the child and
adult litigant in American courts involves the issue of representation.
Because of their legal incapacity, minor children cannot initiate or
defend lawsuits without adult assistance.6 Traditionally, the minor
plaintiff has been required to bring a lawsuit through a "next friend,"
while a minor who is sued must be represented by a "guardian ad li-
tem." Today, these terms are used interchangeably (guardian ad li-
tem will be used herein).7
Most states now model their rules related to the representation of
children in litigation on Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which states:
Whenever an infant [minor child] has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative
may sue or defend on behalf of the infant .... An infant ... who does not
have a duly appointed representative may sue by next friend or by a guardian
ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant ... not
otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant .... 8
Normally, of course, a minor child affected by civil litigation will
not initially come before the court with a "duly appointed represen-
tative," and thus the court will have to address at the outset the ques-
tion of who should perform that function. Usually, parents of the
child will serve in this capacity, and they generally can do so without
formal appointment by the court.9 But what about where the inter-
ests of the parents may conflict with those of the child? Some exam-
ples of such actions include:
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c), which addresses the capacity of parties, treats minor
children and incompetent persons identically.
7. See 42 AM. JuR. 2d Infants § 158 (1969).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c). See also Gardner v. Parsons, 874 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.
1989)(guardian ad litem should have been appointed for mentally retarded minor in
federal civil rights action challenging the quality of state-provided care); Shearer v.
Coates, 434 N.W.2d 596 (S.D. 1989)(defendant minor in state court action may not have
default judgment entered against him unless court-appointed guardian ad litem repre-
sents him and appears in the case).
9. See Annotation, Necessity for and Degree of Relationship to Infant as Affect-
ing Representation as Next Friend or Guardian Ad Litem, 118 A.L.R. 401, 402 (1939).
(a) When a child sues his parents, which is becoming more com-
mon as the traditional legal doctrine of parental immunity
has eroded;lo
(b) When a child seeks an order from the court under laws re-
lated to judicially authorized abortions without parental noti-
fication or consent; 1
(c) When parents seek a court order to have their mentally re-
tarded child sterilized;12 and
(d) When a child seeks to challenge some administrative action
(e.g., a school suspension) against the parent's wishes.
In such situations, any person with an interest in the welfare of the
child may generally serve as the "next friend" or guardian ad litem.
Some states will permit the child to nominate his or her own repre-
sentative. In addition, some courts will even permit litigation affect-
ing the child to proceed without such an appointment where the
child is an older, "mature" minor who is able to participate in the
legal action, and where the child is represented by legal counsel.
Guardians ad litem for minor children in civil actions affecting
children are usually considered "officers of the court." Although
such a guardian ad litem is not a party to the action, he or she is re-
sponsible for representing and protecting the best interests of the
child until the litigation is concluded, or until the child reaches the
age of majority. The powers of guardians ad litem include the au-
thority to engage legal counsel on behalf of the child and to facilitate
settlement or other methods of speedy resolution of the case. Their
conduct is subject to the scrutiny of the court, and if their actions ad-
versely affect the child, they can be removed.13
B. When the Child is Not a Party, But Has an Interest in the
Outcome of the Litigation
In cases where the child may be affected by some form of on-going
civil lawsuit, American courts have clear authority to appoint a
guardian ad litem to protect the interests of the child. The judge in
such cases may even add the child as a party to the litigation. Some
examples of where the child may need to be represented and heard
in litigation affecting his or her rights include:
10. See Horowitz & Goodman, The Child Litigant, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
§ 3.08 (Horowitz & Davidson, eds. 1984).
11. See Dodson, Legal Rights of Adolescents, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 4.16
(Horowitz & Davidson, eds. 1984).
12. See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426
A.2d 467 (1981).
13. See, e.g., In re B.B.B., 393 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)(court may not re-
move guardian ad litem without specific finding that he failed to act in best interests of
child).
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(a) Actions involving insurance policy claims where the child
has a potential monetary interest in such policy;
(b) Probate/inheritance proceedings in which the child may
have a financial stake in the outcome;
(c) Claims for certain benefits to which an adult, and his or her
child, may be entitled, such as workers' compensation, social
security, public assistance, etc.; and
(d) Suits to determine ownership of certain assets, the resolution
of which may affect children as the later beneficiaries of
such property.
Although the above examples suggest that the child's interest in
existing litigation must be a monetary one in order that the child be
added as a party, a monetary interest is not required. Courts have
been given increasingly wide discretion to add children as parties and
provide them with the assistance of guardian ad litem representation
when critical to the protection of their interests.1 4 For example, the
authority of judges to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child victim
or witness in criminal proceedings at which the child may appear has
recently been the subject of judicial and legislative attention.15
III. SOURCES OF, AND STANDARDS FOR, LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN
A. Resources for Child Representation
Given the broad authority of American courts to protect the rights
and interests of children through the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, it is disconcerting that the ranks of specially qualified attor-
neys for children are so thin. Unlike jurisdictions such as Canada's
Ontario Province, which maintains an "Official Guardian" child rep-
resentation program, there are no federal or state agencies in this
14. Indeed, some federal courts have reversed a trial court for failing to determine
whether a guardian ad litem is necessary. See, e.g., Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11-12 (6th
Cir. 1974).
15. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 203 N.J. Super. 351, 496 A.2d 1140 (Ct. Law Div.
1985)(children appointed a guardian ad litem in order to assess whether their best in-
terests would be harmed through their participation in prosecution of father charged
with murdering their mother); Stewart v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 227, 787 P.2d 126
(Ct. App. 1989) (inherent authority to appoint guardian ad litem for child witness
where the parents' interests are shown to be in conflict with the best interests of the
child); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.15 (West Supp. 1990) (prosecuting witnesses who are
children are entitled to have their interests represented by guardians ad litem in cer-
tain criminal proceedings including incest, sexual abuse, etc.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 846(B) (West Supp. 1990) (guardians ad litem shall be appointed for child victims in
certain criminal child abuse cases). See also Hardin, Guardians Ad Litem for Child
Victims in Criminal Proceedings, 25 J. FAM. L. 687 (1986-87).
country established specifically to protect children's interests in all
forms of civil litigation.
There is a small (under 2000 members), but important, National
Association of Counsel for Children in the United States.16 For over
a decade the Association has been a vehicle for training and informa-
tion dissemination for attorneys who specialize in what its founder,
Donald Bross, has dubbed "pediatric law." In 1978 the American Bar
Association, through its Young Lawyers Division, founded the ABA
Center on Children and the Law.17 This has become the primary
ABA vehicle for addressing the legal needs of the nation's children.
There is a minuscule number of small law offices in America that
specialize in representation of children (e.g., San Francisco's Legal
Services for Children; Charlotte, North Carolina's Children's Legal
Center; and the Massachusetts Children's Law Center). Many public
defender agencies and legal services or legal aid offices, as well as a
few special county-administered guardian ad litem programs, are in-
volved in providing representation to children. However, their assist-
ance is generally obtainable only in the special proceedings described
below (and typically only in one or two types of these).
The most common source of representation for children is the pri-
vate bar, whose members are regularly appointed by judges (typically
from "sign-up" lists or panels) in cases involving indigent parties or
minors. However, these attorneys are usually appointed without any
prerequisite education in the special knowledge and skills needed by
those who represent children. Most states lack any statewide effort
to support, or upgrade the competency of, court-appointed attorneys
for children.
A few states have addressed the needs of such lawyers by develop-
ing special education, training, and standards-setting programs and
projects. For example, for over a decade the District of Columbia Su-
perior Court has sponsored a "Counselfor Child Abuse and Neglect"
program that provides expert legal and social worker support to
panel attorneys, as well as mandatory basic legal education programs
and continuing skills-building seminars.
In New York State, to aid court-appointed counsel for children
(statutorily referred to as "law guardians"), there are four regional
law guardian programs and program directors, local law guardian ad-
visory committees, a series of training programs offered throughout
the state, and a periodical, Law Guardian Reporter. The latter con-
tains feature articles, updated bibliographies, digests of relevant fed-
16. The National Association of Counsel for Children can be contacted at 1205
Oneida Street, Denver, CO. 80220.
17. The ABA Center on Children and the Law can be contacted at 1800 M Street,
N.W., Suite S-200, Washington, DC 20036.
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eral and state cases, and descriptions of new state legislation. In
addition, a set of standards for law guardian practice has been pub-
lished by the New York State Bar.18
The Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services has a
Family Law Advocacy Project. This project has developed a state-
wide certification requirement (two days of "basic training") for law-
yers accepting court appointments in child abuse and neglect-related
cases. It also sponsors a host of training programs, publishes a news-
letter and other special materials, and continues to set standards for
court-appointed attorneys for children.
Lawyers for children, however, are not necessarily considered in-
dispensable. There are two factors that have caused many courts to
implement a far simpler, and less expensive, alternative approach to
independent advocacy for children in court. The first factor is the es-
calating public expense involved in compensating court-appointed at-
torneys for children in cases in which legal counsel is, or is not,
constitutionally or statutorily mandated. The second factor is the
often poor performance of court-appointed legal counsel for children.
In a few states (e.g., Florida and North Carolina), there are state-
wide guardian ad litem programs that use unpaid lay citizen volun-
teers to represent children in court. These appointments are limited
to civil child protection-related cases and, in rare instances, to abuse-
related child custody disputes.19 In recent years, a nationwide move-
ment to utilize such lay volunteers, in place of court-appointed law-
yers for children or attorneys serving as guardians ad litem, has
become widespread. Such volunteers are now commonly called
Court-Appointed Special Advocates (C.A.S.A.).20
There are reported to be over 400 local C.A.S.A. or volunteer lay
guardian ad litem programs throughout the country. Several legisla-
tures have embraced the volunteer C.A.S.A./guardian ad litem model
by amending laws to permit lay volunteer representation of children
18. LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS, (NEW YORK STATE BAR A5S'N
COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CHILD WELFARE 1988).
19. Both the Florida and North Carolina programs are part of the office of state.
court administration, receive targeted legislative appropriations, have state guardian ad
litem program directors, and promulgate uniform statewide standards and training
programs.
20. The National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association can be contacted
at 2722 Eastlake Avenue E., Suite 220, Seattle, WA. 98102. The Association has en-
dorsed a set of standards for local C.A.S.A. programs and has participated in the devel-
opment of the Comprehensive Training Program for the C.A.S.A./G.A.L. (New York
City: Edna McConnell Clark Foundation 1989).
as a substitute for court-appointed counsel or attorneys serving as
guardians ad litem.21 However, the majority of states still require, by
law or policy, that court-appointed guardians ad litem for children in
abuse and neglect cases be attorneys - or that children in these
cases have appointed legal counsel.22 In August of 1989, the Ameri-
can Bar Association adopted a policy stating that, in child abuse and
neglect-related judicial proceedings, all children should be repre-
sented by both a lay guardian ad litem (C.A.S.A.) and an attorney
acting as the child's legal counsel.
B. Improving the Quality of Child Representation
In 1979, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates ap-
proved a set of Juvenile Justice Standards developed by a joint com-
mission established by the ABA and the Institute of Judicial
Administration. One of the volumes, Standards Relating to Counsel
for Private Parties, more than a decade after its approval by the
ABA, remains one of the few comprehensive sets of guidelines avail-
able to court-appointed lawyers for children.23 Another set of guide-
lines is available from the National Association of Counsel for
Children). The ABA Standards address such subjects as the lawyer's:
(a) time of entry into a case and duration of representation;
(b) relationship with social workers involved with the child;
(c) need to have available adequate investigative and case plan-
ning support services;
(d) means of determining what is in the child client's interests;
(e) ability to maintain the confidentiality of the child's commu-
nications to the attorney;
(f) role in advising and counseling the child; and
(g) protection of the child's right to treatment.
These Standards reject the use of attorneys as merely guardians ad
litem entrusted with protecting the child's "best interests." Rather,
they suggest the preference that lawyers exercise their professional
responsibility as they would in representing an adult. The Standards
are, therefore, oriented toward assuring that the child's own views
concerning the case will be effectively heard in court through a law-
yer-advocate.
21. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1) (Supp. 1988) ("The term guard-
ian ad litem is inclusive of lay court appointed special advocates .... ").
22. Davidson, Collaborative Advocacy on Behalf of Children: Effective Partner-
ships Between CASA and the Child's Attorney, in ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE
LAw, LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN 17, 22 (1990).
23. See STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1980). See also
LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS, supra note 18; D. DUQUETTE, ADVOCAT.
ING FOR THE CHILD IN PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS (1990).
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C. Difficulties in Defining the Role and Accountability of the
Child's Court-Appointed Representative
In 1983 the American Bar Association adopted a set of new Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. These rules require that lawyers, as
far as is reasonably possible, maintain a normal lawyer-client rela-
tionship with clients whose decision-making capacities are in some
way impaired.24 However, in child abuse/neglect, custody/visitation,
and termination of parental rights cases, attorneys are often ap-
pointed not as "legal counsel" but rather as guardians ad litem for
children. In such cases, the attorney's perception of his or her role
may vary. Factors affecting such role perceptions, and the carrying
out of guardian ad litem responsibilities, include:
a) how the role is described, if at all, in state law;
b) any instruction given by, or expectations of, the appointing
judge;
c) the training that has been received, if any, in the scope of the
guardian ad litem's role; and
d) the age of the child and the guardian ad litem's understanding
of child development, bonding and attachment, and perma-
nency planning issues.
Even in delinquency cases, a lawyer for a child faces potential con-
flict over whether he or she should function as a traditional legal ad-
vocate. Judges may place pressure on such attorneys to propose case
outcomes that, strictly speaking, are not favored by their child cli-
ents.25 In child abuse/neglect and child custody related cases, where
the attorney is appointed as the child's guardian ad litem, role con-
flict is even more likely. A lawyer for the child or guardian ad litem
will frequently be expected to present all available evidence that he
or she believes is related to the child's best interests.26
24. MODEL RuLFs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a)(1983).
25. See, e.g., In re K.M.B., 123 Ill. App. 3d 645, 462 N.E.2d 1271 (1984) (defense at-
torneys at disposition hearings in delinquency cases must propose dispositions that are
in their clients' best interests, not merely advocate what the child wishes).
26. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Barenthouse, 765 P.2d 610 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 (1989) (attorney appointed for the child should present all
evidence available regarding child's best interests, not merely repeat child's expressed
wishes); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 699 P.2d 79 (1985) (where child's attor-
ney has perception that the child's interests clash with the child's wishes, the attorney
is obligated to advocate the child's best interest); contra In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17
Ohio St. 3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985) (where lawyer/guardian ad litem has a role con-
flict, he should petition court to permit him to withdraw as guardian ad litem, and
court should grant such a request); Arizona State Bar Comm. on Rules of Professional
Conduct, Op. No. 86-13 (1986) (if conflict arises between wishes of the child and best
In addition to the confusion over the role of attorneys appointed as
either legal counsel or guardians ad litem for children, there is a
question as to whether children's communications to their attorneys
are privileged. As more states use C.A.S.A. or nonattorney guardians
ad litem, there is a greater risk that children will not be able to rely
upon the confidentiality of communications with their court-ap-
pointed advocates. If a child's disclosures are made to a nonattorney
advocate, the lawyer-client privilege will not apply. Where an attor-
ney is appointed as the child's legal counsel, the communications
should remain privileged.27 But if the attorney is appointed as the
child's guardian ad litem, the privilege may not apply.28
The scope of the duties of court-appointed attorneys for children or
guardians ad litem is increasingly being addressed through state leg-
islation and court decisions. Although no single law has mandated all
of the following duties, in civil child abuse/neglect cases legislatures
have required court-appointed advocates for the child to:
a) introduce/examine witnesses and present evidence to the
court;
b) accompany the child to, and be present at, all court
proceedings;
c) speak regularly with the child and observe the child in his/
her placement situation;
d) conduct an independent investigation of the case, including
interviews with the child's parents, caretakers, etc.;
e) review all relevant records and reports;
f) file a report and recommendations with the court related to
the child's welfare; and
g) monitor to assure that the court's orders and child welfare
agency's responsibilities are being carried out.
Regardless of whether the role of the child's attorney or guardian
ad litem is statutorily defined, the courts can be expected to help fur-
ther delineate that role.29 Other issues related to independent repre-
interests of the child as perceived by the lawyer, lawyer must follow the wishes of the
child as much as possible, and he should move for appointment of a new guardian ad
litem).
27. See, e.g., In re Order Compelling Production of Records of Maraziti, 233 N.J.
Super. 488, 559 A.2d 447 (Ct. App. Div. 1989) (communications between minor children
and their attorney in civil child protective proceeding held to be subject to attorney-
client privilege).
28. See, e.g., Ross v. Gadwah, 131 N.H. 391, 554 A.2d 1284 (1989) (attorney-client
privilege does not apply to guardians ad litem, even if they are'attorneys); Alaska Bar
Ass'n Ethics Op. No. 85-4 (1985) (the attorney-client privilege does not apply when an
attorney is appointed to be the child's guardian ad litem).
29. See, e.g., In re N.C.L., 89 N.C. App. 79, 365 S.E.2d 213 (guardian ad litem ap-
pointed in a termination of parental rights case had the right to intervene in a later
adoption action and to have access to information on the prospective adoptive parents),
review denied, 322 N.C. 481, 370 S.E.2d 226 (1988). Stanley v. Fairfax County Dep't of
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sentation of the child, such as liability and compensation, are also
likely to be the continuing focus of judicial attention.3o
IV. THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN SPECIFIC PROCEEDINGS
A. Juvenile Delinquency and Status Offender Cases
Two important United States Supreme Court cases of the 1960's,
United States v. Kent31 and In re Gault,32 are generally credited with
establishing the right of minor children to be represented by counsel
at all critical stages of delinquency proceedings where they are sub-
ject to a deprivation of liberty.33 The importance of such counsel was
reaffirmed by the Court in the case of Fare v. Michael C.,34 where the
Court noted that:
the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system .... Whether it is a
minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom
society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in
his dealings with the police and the courts."3 5
The "critical" stages of proceedings involving juveniles in which ef-
fective assistance of counsel is, in my view, an essential right include:
(a) pre-adjudication interrogations;
(b) identifications and line-ups; 36
Social Services, 10 Va. App. 596, 395 S.E.2d 199 (1990) (guardian ad litem in an abuse/
neglect case had the authority to file a termination of parental rights petition); South
Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 87-8 (undated)(guardian ad litem in
abuse/neglect case could later represent the child in a tort action against the Depart-
ment of Social Services for negligent supervision of the child's abusive parents).
30. See, e.g., Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1988)(guardian ad litem
for child is absolutely immune from liability for acts within the scope of his or her
statutory responsibilities); Cabinet for Human Resources v. Howard, 705 S.W.2d 935
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (juvenile court has the authority to award attorney's and guardian
ad litem's fees against state child welfare agency in abuse/neglect cases); In re M.P.,
453 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 472 So.2d 732 (1985) (court can
require public welfare agency to pay reasonable fees of guardians ad litem in abuse/
neglect cases, but on a scale below what attorneys would generally receive from paying
clients); Div. of Youth and Family Services v. D.C., 118 N.J. 388, 571 A.2d 1295 (1990)
(court-appointed attorneys for children in termination of parental rights cases have no
statutory right to payment for their services, and state's refusal to pay these fees did
not violate attorneys' constitutional rights).
31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
32. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. It should be noted that Gault only indicated that a child is entitled to counsel
in "proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an insti-
tution" Id. at 41.
34. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
35. Id. at 719.
36. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Minnis, 312 Pa. Super. 53, 458 A.2d 231 (1983)
(counsel must be present at line-up unless identification occurred at the scene of the
crime).
(c) responses to charges in the court petition;
(d) detention hearings;3 7
(e) adjudication and disposition hearings;
(f) hearings on the issue of whether a juvenile court will trans-
fer jurisdiction of the case so that a child may be tried as an
adult (also known as waiver hearings);38 and
(g) probation and parole revocation hearings.
Many laws fail to state precisely those stages of delinquency cases,
or pre-judicial situations, in which there is a right to counsel. Some
use the term "at all critical stages of" the proceeding,3 9 others
merely use the term "right to counsel" without designating the stages
of a case to which the right does or does not apply,40 while still
others simply extend the right to "every stage of all [juvenile]
proceedings."41
The right to counsel during court proceedings is generally waivable
by the juvenile after a hearing that determines that the waiver of
counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.42 There have been
some laws and court decisions, however, that have placed limits on
the court's ability to approve waivers of counsel by juveniles.43 In
some instances, if a child did not adequately waive counsel in earlier
juvenile delinquency proceedings, later court actions may not be able
to rely upon these prior adjudications.44
37. See, e.g., State ex rel M.C.H. & S.A.H. v. Kinder, 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va.
1984)(right to counsel exists at detention hearings).
38. But see State v. McCoy, 285 S.C. 115, 328 S.E.2d 620 (1985) (transfer hearing is
not a trial; therefore, counsel's failure to reveal exculpatory evidence was not error).
39. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304(a)(1981); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A4A-39
(West 1982)
40. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (West 1982).
41. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10 (Vernon 1986).
42. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). See also In re Juvenile Ap-
peal, 39 Conn. Supp. 400, 465 A.2d 1107 (1983) (child cannot waive counsel by mere si-
lence after his attorney has withdrawn from the case).
43. See, e.g., In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 543 A.2d 719 (1988) (the child's age,
the mother's conflicting interest in waiving counsel, and the child's own participation
in waiver-related discussions are relevant factors for courts assessing the appropriate-
ness of a waiver of counsel); In re B.M.H., 177 Ga. App. 478, 339 S.E.2d 757 (1986)
(court must inform juvenile and parents of the risks of going forward without counsel,
including the disposition that could be made following an adjudication); State ex re.
Juvenile Dept. v. Cheney, 96 Or. App. 680, 773 P.2d 1351 (1989) (court is required to
assure that prior to waiver the child understood the nature of the charges, possible
penalties that the court could impose, and the overall impact of the waiver decision);
State ex re. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981) (right to counsel during adju-
dicatory stage cannot be waived except on the advice of the child's attorney); N.Y. JUD.
LAw § 249-a (McKinney 1983) ("the court shall not permit the [juvenile] to waive his
right to be represented by counsel"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.09(a), 51.10(b)
(Vernon 1986) (right can generally be waived only with advice of counsel, and repre-
sentation during adjudicatory and disposition hearings may not be waived). See also,
Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1970);
Comment, Waiver of Counsel by Minor Defendants, 3 TULSA L.J. 193 (1966).
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Alton v. Conkling, 421 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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As we approach the twenty-fifth anniversary of the historic Gault
decision, several commentators on the juvenile justice system have
described how courts are still failing to assure the appearance of law-
yers on behalf of children in delinquency proceedings, sometimes in
large numbers of cases. 45 The waiver of counsel by the juvenile is
the most common explanation that judges give in cases where the
child does not have representation. 46
Neither Kent, Gault, nor any other Supreme Court decision, has
addressed the issue of the child's right to representation in cases
brought by parents or others alleging the child's incorrigibility, run-
away behavior, or school truancy ("status offender" cases). Even
when a child is locked up in a secure correctional or treatment insti-
tution, or otherwise punitively sanctioned as a result of a status of-
fender proceeding, a child may not have the right to legal counsel
under state law. Although many states, by legislation, have provided
such a right,47 appellate courts have differed their views as to
whether counsel should be required in such cases. 48 There is also
controversy over the role and function of court-appointed advocates
for children in juvenile status offender cases.49
When an allegedly recalcitrant youth has defied a juvenile court's
1982) (juvenile court adjudications that occurred without a proper waiver of counsel
cannot be used as the basis for later proceedings to transfer the juvenile to adult
court).
45. See, e.g., B. FELD, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT: FULFILLING
GAULT'S PROMISE (1989); Aday, Court Structure, Defense Attorney Use, and Juvenile
Court Decisions, 27 Soc. Q. 107-19 (1986); Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court
An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the D(fference They Make, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1185 (1989); Feld, In re Gault Revisited,- A Cross-State Corn.
parison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1988).
46. B. FELD, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT: FULFILLING GAULT'S
PROMISE, supra note 45, at 8.
47. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(H)(1981).
48. Compare In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975) (due process right to
counsel where child's alleged acts would be criminal violations if committed by an
adult and child faces commitment to juvenile institution) with State ex rel. Juvenile
Dep't of Multonomah County v. K., 26 Or. App. 451, 554 P.2d 180 (1976) (when child
not subject to incarceration due process may require less than the "entire spectrum of
rights" constitutionally guaranteed in criminal proceedings - i.e., notice, right to
counsel, right to confront witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination).
49. Compare In re Lisa G., 127 N.H. 585, 504 A.2d 1 (1986) (role of defense counsel
in status offender proceedings is to advocate the juvenile's position and protect the
child's constitutional rights, but court retains discretion to appoint guardian ad litem to
protect the child's best interests even in the absence of a statute requiring such ap-
pointment). But see Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. No. 76-1 (1976)
(when children are unable to make "informed judgments" regarding their own inter-
ests, counsel are obligated to advocate their belief as to child clients' best interests,
even when contrary to the childrens' expressed wishes).
order in a status offender proceeding, the federal Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act allows exceptions to the Act's gen-
eral prohibition of secure detention for status offenders. In 1980 and
1984, Congress granted states participating in federal financial assist-
ance under the Act the authority to order children who had defied
"valid court orders" related to prior treatment and placement into se-
cure residential settings.50 The federal agency administering the Act
has, however, issued regulations requiring that the child have a judi-
cial hearing, with representation by counsel, before the youth may be
securely incarcerated.51
B. Child Abuse/Neglect and Custody/Visitation Related Cases
By statute in almost every state, children in civil child protective
proceedings initiated by the state or county (child abuse and neglect
cases) have a right to have a representative appointed by the court to
independently protect their interests in the litigation.52 A primary
impetus for such laws was not a Supreme Court decision, but rather
the 1974 federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.53 This
Act requires that states receiving certain federal assistance for child
protective services assure that every child involved in a civil child
protective proceeding has a court-appointed guardian ad litem.
Although the federal law did not specify whether the guardian ad li-
tem must be an attorney, statutes in about half of the states require
the appointment of either legal counsel or an attorney who serves as
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5603(16), 5633(a)(12)(A) (1988) (originally enacted as Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1109, 1111). Section 5603(16) was added in
1984 by Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 613(6). The amendment provides:
The term "valid court order" means a court order given by a juvenile court
judge to a juvenile who has been brought before the court and made subject to
a court order. The use of the word "valid" permits the incarceration of
juveniles for violation of a valid court order only if they received their full
due process rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States ....
Section 5633(a)12(A) was amended in 1980 by Pub. L. No. 96-509 § 11(a)(13). The stat-
ute provides in pertinent part:
In order to receive formula grants under this part, a State shall submit a plan
for carrying out its purposes applicable to a 3-year period ....
In accordance with regulations which the Administrator shall prescribe, such
shall ...
(12)(A) provide ... that juveniles who are charged with or who have commit-
ted offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult or offenses
which do not constitute violations of valid court orders, or such nonoffenders
as dependent or neglected children, shall not be placed in secure detention fa-
cilities or secure correctional facilities ....
51. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(f)(iii)(3)(v)(1990). Prior to the amendment of the federal
law, in In re Hutchins, 345 So. 2d 703; 707 (Fla. 1977), the Florida Supreme Court held
that where, because of a prior status offense or "ungovernability" proceeding, the child
faces a subsequent similar hearing, the child may not be incarcerated unless the child
was represented by counsel at the earlier proceeding.
52. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A)(1982).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1988).
[Vol. 18: 255, 1991] The Child's Right to be Heard
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the child's guardian ad litem.54
Today, in most civil child protective proceedings, a legal counsel, a
lawyer serving as guardian ad litem, a C.A.S.A., or a combination of
these, is required by law at some point during the court's hearing of
the case. However, these advocates often are not appointed at the
earliest possible stage of each proceeding. These representatives are
typically involved with the case through its formal adjudication and
disposition stages. In post dispositional case review hearings, and es-
pecially in separate termination of parental rights proceedings,5 5
state statutes and appellate courts rarely require - and thus children
are much less likely to have - court-appointed representation.56 In
particular, it seems odd and unfortunate that all states do not clearly
mandate appointment of counsel for the child in termination of pa-
rental rights hearings, since the long-term consequences are greatest
in these cases. 5 7
In intra-family custody or visitation disputes related to parental
separation or divorce, the child's right to independent legal represen-
tation is even less established. Only a few states require a court to
appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for the child in a custody or
visitation case, even when one parent accuses the other of child
54. Davidson, supra note 22 at 22.
55. See, e.g., In re Kapcsos, 468 Pa. 50, 360 A.2d 174 (1976) (no right to counsel for
child in termination of parental rights action, despite statutory right to counsel in prior
dependency proceeding); In re D., 24 Or. App. 607, 547 P.2d 175 (1976) (in termination
of parental rights proceeding, child does not have right to independent counsel), cert
denied sub nom. C. v. F., 429 U.S. 907 (1976); but see Leonard v. Leonard, 783 S.W.2d
514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (where basis for seeking termination of parental rights is sex-
ual abuse, failure to appoint guardian ad litem is error); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d 226
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (termination decree reversed where children were not provided
with effective assistance of counsel).
56. See, e.g., Ivy v. Edna Gladney Home, 783 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (be-
cause adoption agency adequately represents child's best interests in termination of pa-
rental rights action, failure to appoint guardian ad litem is neither improper nor
violative of statutory requirements); but see In re Child X, 617 P.2d 1078 (Wyo. 1980)
(in termination of parental rights proceeding, statute requiring appointed counsel to
also serve as guardian ad litem mandates appointment of counsel to protect child's wel-
fare); In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 470 (Okla. 1980) (in all termination cases potential
conflicts of interest between the child, parents, and state, court must appoint counsel
for child).
57. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of mandatory
appointment of counsel for the child in termination of parental rights proceedings;
however, the Court suggested in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), that a child facing removal from a long-term foster home
may have asserted some liberty interest, but at least in the foster family setting, the
diminished due process interest does not support the right to independent counsel for
the child where the state's preremoval procedures adequately protect the interests of
all parties.
abuse.58 It is clear, however, that judges always have discretion, even
if rarely exercised, to appoint legal counsel or a guardian ad litem for
the child.59 However, appellate courts may still find that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to appoint separate representa-
tion for the child.60
Although courts do not routinely appoint legal representatives for
children in intra-family conflict cases, they have given varying de-
grees of consideration to children's stated custodial preferences. As
children approach the age of majority, courts increase the weight
given to the views of children. Approximately half the states have
statutes listing the child's custodial wishes as one factor the court
must consider, or give special weight to, when making a custodial de-
termination.6 1 Only a few states make the child's custodial wishes
generally binding, and only so long as the parent is fit.62
Even in the absence of statutes mandating consideration of the
child's wishes, judges who fail to elicit or who totally ignore chil-
dren's custodial preferences are increasingly likely to have their cus-
tody orders reversed on appeal.63 The views of the affected children
are also increasingly important in custodial disputes, such as con-
tested changes from sole to joint custody, or when a custodial parent
seeks the court's permission to move to another state.
58. The most prominent state laws to require appointment of a guardian ad litem
for a child in all contested custody cases are Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1990) (formerly § 247.045), construed in de Montigny v. de Montigny, 75 Wis. 2d
131, 233 N.W.2d 463 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a (1983).
59. See, e.g., Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394, 556 A.2d 1162 (lawyer appointed for
five-year-old child subjected to a protracted custody dispute), cert. denied, 316 Md. 549,
560 A.2d 1118 (1989); McDonald v. McGowan, 163 Ill. App. 3d 697, 516 N.E.2d 934 (1987)
(guardian ad litem appointed in visitation dispute); Van Houten v. Van Houten, 156
A.D.2d 694, 549 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1989) (appointment of guardian ad litem required during
custody proceedings after father kidnapped daughter during visitation and concealed
her whereabouts for eight years); but see Smith v. Smith, 724 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986)(despite allegations of child abuse, court did not abuse its discretion in custody
proceeding by ruling without appointing guardian ad litem); Sucher v. Sucher, 416
N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (appointment of guardian ad litem not required
where evidence from other sources is sufficient for decision based on child's best inter-
ests); Cotton v. Cotton, 11 Conn. App. 189, 526 A.2d 547 (1987) (court not required to
appoint counsel to represent minor children in custody dispute).
60. See, e.g., G.S. v. T.S., 23 Conn. App. 509, 582 A.2d 467 (1990) (custody award
reversed for failure to appoint counsel for child).
61. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. 40-4-219(1)(d)(1989). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9
(1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-102 (Supp. 1990).
62. These states include West Virginia and Georgia (children age 14 and over).
See, e.g., S.H. v. R.L.H., 169 W. Va. 550, 289 S.E.2d 186 (1982) (rule created by court);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-9-1(a), 19-9-3(a) (Supp. 1990).
63. See, e.g., Flaherty v. Smith, 87 Mich. App. 561, 274 N.W.2d 72 (1978) (reversing
for failure to adequately determine and consider child's custodial preference); In re
Marriage of Kramer, 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439 (1978) (trial court abused its discretion
by failing to make specific finding of child's custodial preference and by failing to state
reasons for not following this preference).
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C. Paternity and Support Cases
It is generally accepted that a child, acting through either the
mother, a guardian, or the state may bring a paternity action. Under
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which has been adopted in only a
few states, a child must be made a party to any paternity action.64
The UPA also requires that if the child is a minor, he or she must be
represented by a guardian or guardian ad litem. Neither the child's
mother nor father may serve in either of those capacities due to the
potential conflict of interest. In states that have not adopted the
UPA, however, the prevailing view is that a guardian ad litem is not
required when the mother and child's interests are sufficiently
similar.65
If paternity is contested, some states, regardless of whether they
have adopted the UPA, will appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.
By making the child a party and providing a guardian ad litem, the
court may avoid subsequent re-litigation by the child.66 Courts have
also spoken clearly about the child's interests in these cases. For ex-
ample, in Ford v. Ford 67 the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that:
a decision as to legitimacy is one in which the two children, independent of
the dispute between the parents, have a vital and enduring interest affecting
their own life, which requires that it be independently protected by the court
and the representation of counsel. The children's interests may be adverse to
both parents in the case." 6 8
That view, however, applies only in a minority of states when stat-
utes or case law require appointment of counsel or guardians ad litem
64. Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973) (approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973).
65. See, e.g., T.R. v. A.W. ex reL Pearson, 470 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), rehg
denied, Jan. 24, 1985, transfer denied May 1, 1985 (no appointed counsel for child
needed where mother's interests not sufficiently different from child's); Mistretta v.
Mistretta, 566 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (no appointment for child needed
when nonparty parent's interests are not adverse to child's); but see Johannessen v.
Johannessen, 148 A.D.2d 894, 539 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1989) (appointment of special guardian
necessary because children not adequately protected in divorce action where paternity
and child support were at issue).
66. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex reL Gray v. Johnson, 7 Va. App. 614, 376 S.E.2d 787
(1989) (because mother acts only as conduit for child's support, and her interests may
be adverse, mother and child will not be considered in privity unless child was for-
mally named as party, was represented by guardian ad litem, and was given an ade-
quate opportunity to litigate paternity issue); Department of Revenue v. Jarvenpaa,
404 Mass. 177, 534 N.E.2d 286 (1989) (child is not barred by a putative father's acquittal
in criminal paternity prosecution from filing subsequent civil action to establish pater-
nity); Arsenault v. Carrier, 390 A.2d 1048 (Me. 1978) (child was not bound by agree-
ment between mother and putative father in prior paternity action).
67. 191 Neb. 548, 216 N.W.2d 176 (1974).
68. Id. at 549-50, 216 N.W.2d at 177.
for children in paternity cases.6 9
In Mills v. Habluetzel,70 Justice O'Connor identified a rationale for
making the child a party to paternity actions and providing the child
with independent representation. She noted that a mother may de-
cide to bring a paternity action because of motives unrelated to the
child's best interests, such as the mother's desire to maintain a cor-
dial relationship with the father.71
When the issue is child support, rather than paternity, the duty of
support is clearly owed to the child, not to the custodial parent. Typ-
ically, however, custodial mothers or state/county welfare agencies
initiate child support actions. Rarely does a court consider ap-
pointing counsel or a guardian ad litem for the child, essential in
such actions.72 Only when a child reaches the age of majority, or is
otherwise emancipated, have courts permitted enforcement actions
on the child's own behalf.
D. Adoption Cases
State laws generally designate a minimum age above which chil-
dren who are the subject of adoption actions must give consent, often
in open court, before the adoption can become effective. This desig-
nated age typically ranges from ten to fourteen.73 If a child of suffi-
cient age opposes a stepparent adoption, however, courts may have
authority to waive or dispense with the consent requirement.74 The
preferences of younger children may also be considered, but are not
binding.
In uncontested stepparent adoptions, or adoptions arranged
through licensed adoption agencies, courts seldom appoint an in-
dependent representative for the child.75 Even in privately arranged
69. See, e.g., In re S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 507 N.E.2d 736 (1987) (child should have
guardian ad litem in paternity action brought by father); LeHew v. Mellyn, 131 Ill.
App. 3d 314, 475 N.E.2d 913 (1985) (where putative father seeks to prove paternity and
establish visitation rights, a guardian ad litem should be appointed); In re Burley, 33
Wash. App. 629, 658 P.2d 8 (1983). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 para. 2507(c) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990).
70. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
71. 1& at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Robin v. Robin, 45 Ill. App. 3d 365, 359 N.E.2d 809 (1977) (appoint-
ment of guardian ad litem and award of fees reversed when primary issue was child
support).
73. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106B (West 1989) (consent of child age 12
and above required); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 710.43(2)(West Supp. 1990) (consent of
child over age 14 required).
74. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1)(c) (West 1985) (court may dispense with
requirement of child's consent to adoption if in child's best interest); N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 111.1(a) (McKinney 1988) (judge has discretion to dispense with consent
requirement).
75. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima County, 138 Ariz. 291, 674 P.2d 845 (1983) (coun-
sel for children appointed when step-father sought to vacate earlier adoption).
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(independent) adoptions, few states require the appointment of coun-
sel or a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of the child.76 Dis-
cretionary appointments are occasionally made when an adoption
proceeding is contested. These include cases where fraud, duress, or
coercion in connection with the adoption is alleged by the biological
parent; when such parent seeks to revoke his other prior consent;
when the necessity for a non-custodial parent's consent is disputed;
or when the suitability of the adoptive placement is questioned. A
child may also be represented in an adoption proceeding by a person
previously appointed in an earlier proceeding involving the child.7 7
There are currently two proposed "model" state laws on adoption
in various stages of development. The more complete product is the
American Bar Association Model State Adoption Act.78 Although
this Act has been approved by the A.B.A. Family Law Section, it has
not been approved by the Association's House of Delegates and thus
does not yet constitute official A.B.A. policy. Section 21 of that Act
provides only for discretionary appointment of independent represen-
tation for children subject to adoption proceedings.79 Similarly, sec-
tion 60 of a recent draft of a proposed Uniform Adoption Act makes
appointment of an attorney or guardian ad litem for the child merely
discretionary, both in agency placement adoptions as well as in in-
dependent adoptions.80
E. Psychiatric Commitment Cases
Historically, almost all states have permitted parents to commit
their minor children to mental institutions without any form of due
76. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.025 (1986) (court shall appoint guardian ad li-
tem for child in all adoption proceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-48 (1989) (independ-
ent counsel must be appointed for child in all contested adoption proceedings); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1732 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1989) (court must appoint guardian ad litem
for child in all adoption proceedings). The majority of state codes are silent on this
issue, while approximately 15 states provide for discretionary appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem for children in adoption proceedings.
77. See, e.g., In re Christina D., 525 A.2d 1306 (R.I. 1987) (error for trial judge in an
adoption case to deny standing to guardian ad litem appointed in earlier termination of
parental rights proceeding); People ex rel. M.C.P., 768 P.2d 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(because guardian ad litem's responsibilities continue until placement is finalized,
court should have allowed access to information on child's pre-adoptive home to guard-
ian ad litem who represented child in previous dependency proceeding).
78. Draft A.B.A. Model State Adoption Act, 19 FAM. L.Q. 103 (1985).
79. Id, at 120.
80. This draft was submitted at the July 13-20, 1990 meeting of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It does not necessarily reflect the
views of the drafting committee, reporter, or Commissioners.
process or judicial hearing. The first major challenges to the "volun-
tary" juvenile commitment process were the parallel United States
Supreme Court cases of Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of
Public WelfareS1 and Parham v. J.R.82 In both of these cases, fed-
eral courts had previously nullified state civil commitment laws that
failed to adequately protect the due process rights of minors.
In Parham, the Supreme Court reversed a federal ruling that had
granted a right to prompt hearings and appointed counsel to children
facing psychiatric hospitalization. The Supreme Court instead re-
quired that children subject to mental commitments merely be af-
forded an independent inquiry by an informal, non-judicial "neutral
factfinder" who would evaluate only whether the legal psychiatric
admission standards were met.
One major implication of this decision was that minor children sub-
ject to psychiatric commitment actions initiated by their parents do
not have a constitutional "right to be heard" through the appoint-
ment of legal representatives. The Court extended the ruling to in-
clude children in the custody of the state or county, rather than their
parents, at the time of the proceedings.
Few Supreme Court decisions have been so criticized by child advo-
cates and those who deal with rights of the mentally disabled as
Parham.83 In spite of this criticism, the majority of states continue to
permit parents to commit their child to a mental health facility,
against the child's wishes, without a judicial or administrative hear-
ing, or appointment of legal representation for the child. Even when
states have given children the right to be heard in cases involving
public psychiatric facilities, these safeguards might not be extended
to minors committed by their parents to private psychiatric hospitals.
The latter actions have in recent years become more prevalent, in
part because state laws have reduced or eliminated the use of secure
institutionalization for juvenile "status offenders." Critics have
charged that parents are substituting such private psychiatric facili-
ties as restrictive placements for troublesome or rebellious children,
particularly where status offender laws no longer afford easy "incar-
cerations" of rebellious or troubled young people.8 4
81. 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
82. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
83. See, e.g., Schoenberger, "Voluntary" Commitment of Mentally 1ll or Retarded
Children: Child Abuse by the Supreme Court, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1981);
Mabbutt, Juveniles, Mental Hospital Commitment and Civil Rights: The Case of
Parham v. J.R., 19 J. FAM. L. 27, 64 (1980-81); Note, Children's Rights Under the Bur-
ger Court: Concern for the Child but Deference to Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1214, 1231 (1985).
84. See, Lambert, Growing Numbers of Youth Committed to Psychiatric Hospitals,
YOUTH L. NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 12.
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F. Administrative and Judicial Actions Related to Public
Education
A number of United States Supreme Court cases have clearly
vested children and their parents with certain due process rights con-
cerning children's education, including school attendance, the educa-
tional program, and disciplinary sanctions imposed by the school.
Under Goss v. Lopez85 children suspended from school for ten days
or less are not entitled to a full panoply of due process protections;
however, longer, major sanctions such as suspensions, expulsions, or
disciplinary transfers to other schools warrant full due process
rights.86 It is by no means clear, however, that in according chil-
dren's due process rights states will require that children subject to
major sanctions be afforded full hearings with the right to counsel.
In Ingraham v. Wright,8 7 the leading case on the use of corporal
punishment by schools, the Court not only held that such discipline
was not "cruel and unusual," but also that it could be administered
without any prior hearing whatever.88 Although a rapidly growing
number of. states have legislated against the use of corporal punish-
ment in schools, the large number of states still permitting its use do
not provide the child with a right to be heard as to whether the mis-
behavior justifies such sanctions.
Special education services for disabled children have generated the
most specific policies concerning the child's right to hearings and rep-
resentation. Under the retitled federal Education of Individuals with
Disabilities Act,89 parents have the right to challenge the school's ed-
ucational placement or the services provided to their child in both ad-
ministrative and judicial hearings. Parents may initially request an
administrative "impartial due process hearing" to resolve differences
with school administrators.
Federal regulations governing such hearings assure parents the
right to be represented by counsel and require that parents be given
notice of any available free or low-cost legal services to help secure
an appropriate educational program for the child.90 In 1986, the Act
was amended to authorize courts to award attorney fees to the par-
85. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
86. lM at 581-584.
87. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
88. Id. at 669-671, 682.
89. The Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988), was re-
titled by Pub. L. No. 101-476 104 Stat. 1103 (1990).
90. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506(c),.508(a)(1)(1986).
ents of disabled children for successful legal work in administrative
or judicial hearings related to securing legally-required special educa-
tion services.91 Since the 1986 amendments, a flood of cases have in-
terpreted the law's attorney fees provisions.9 2 These decisions clarify
the parameters of compensable attorney work under the federal law.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty-five years, a child's right to be heard and rep-
resented in court proceedings has received much legislative, judicial,
bar association, and scholarly attention. Today's American courts are
much more likely than past courts were to focus on hearing from the
child and securing for that child competent and effective, independ-
ent advocacy. Special efforts are being made to elevate the level of
attorney advocacy in children's cases and at the same time, a move-
ment toward lay "court-appointed special advocate" volunteers is
gaining acceptance.
Although children are benefitting by these changes, there are some
lingering concerns. Studies of juvenile delinquency proceedings show
that children are often unrepresented.93 A recent study indicates
that children in civil abuse/neglect proceedings, despite almost
universal statutory mandates, are frequently not provided
representation.94
In certain types of judicial proceedings, such as adoption, children
in most states still do not have a statutory entitlement to independ-
ent representation. Children may lack representation even when the
adoption is contested by the affected adults or when a licensed child
welfare agency is not actively involved.
The aforementioned American Bar Association Standards Relating
to Counsel for Private Parties95 volume sets forth the official ABA
policy on the types of legal proceedings in which children should be
represented. It states:
Counsel should be provided for any juvenile subject to delinquency or in need
91. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(2) (1988); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506-.508 (1990).
92. See, e.g., McSomebodies v. Burlingame Elementary School Dist., 886 F.2d 1558
(9th Cir. 1989) (attorney's fees recoverable for administrative hearing); E.P. v. Union
County Regional High School Dist. No. 1, 741 F. Supp. 1144 (D.N.J. 1989) (attorneys
fees recoverable for administrative proceedings); Burr v. Sobol, 748 F. Supp. 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)(time spent by law students may be reimbursable); Arons v. New
Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1988) (no fees awarded to lay advocate),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
93. B. FELD, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT, supra note 45, at 6-8.
94. See, e.g., CSR INC., NATIONAL STUDY OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM REPRESENTA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 41 (1990) ("Despite statutory re-
quirements for representation, less than 100 percent of all children receive it in 26
States. In six of these States, less than 70 percent of children are represented.").
95. STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1980).
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of supervision proceedings .... Legal representation should also be provided
the juvenile in all proceedings arising from or related to a delinquency or in
need of supervision action, including mental competency, transfer, probation
revocation, and classification, institutional transfer, disciplinary or other ad-
ministrative proceedings related to the treatment process which may substan-
tially affect the juvenile's custody, status or course of treatment ....
Independent counsel should also be provided for the juvenile who is the sub-
ject of proceedings affecting his or her status or custody.9 6
These standards remain generally unfulfilled. Moreover, Ameri-
can government, at the federal, state, and local levels, lacks any or-
ganized program that focuses comprehensively on the needs of
children for independent advocacy in all types of proceedings where
their interests may be affected. Until government addresses this is-
sue more carefully and completely, our nation's legal system will not
be in a position to assure - as Article 12 of the new United Nations
Convention 97 reads - that children's views will be freely heard and
fairly considered throughout our judicial system.
96. 1& at § 2.3.
97. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, at 1461.

